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ALEXANDER A. REINERT† 
In response to Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on Professor Catherine 
Struve’s article, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention,1 which first identifies 
and then offers a remedy for a difficult doctrinal problem that has beset 
corrections advocates for decades. Like Struve, I would welcome courts’ 
adoption of a rigorous analytical approach to regulating the conditions 
under which pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners are confined.2 The 
purpose of this Response is to highlight some narrow concerns I have about 
the feasibility of her proposals, as well as to note my broader analytical 
objections to how Struve frames her intervention. Most critically, I fear that 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013). 
2 There are significant stakes at play in this issue because what we say about pretrial condi-
tions will affect a substantial majority of criminal detainees. Available data do not permit a precise 
estimation of the number of pretrial versus convicted detainees in America’s jails. We do know that 
local jails admitted 11.8 million individuals between midyear 2010 and midyear 2011. See TODD D. 
MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT 
MIDYEAR 2011—STATISTICAL TABLES 3 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf. We also know that at midyear 2011, 60.6% of jail detainees were unconvicted. 
Id. at 7 tbl.7. But it is likely fair to assume that pretrial detainees represent an even greater 
percentage of total jail admissions throughout a calendar year because convicted prisoners have 
longer overall stays in jail. 
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Struve’s solution does not directly address the conditions of confinement 
experienced by detainees, but instead bears indirectly on these conditions 
by focusing on the circumstances under which individual defendants are held 
liable in damages for specific abuses of detainees. 
I. THE SINGULARITY OF PRISON JURISPRUDENCE 
 Struve has provided a thorough summary of the constitutional stand-
ards that regulate the treatment of convicted prisoners.3 I will emphasize a 
few broader aspects of this complex doctrine, however, that are relevant to 
the conditions inflicted on pretrial detainees. First, and uniquely, the Eighth 
Amendment imposes affirmative duties on the government to provide for 
the material welfare of prisoners in many forms.4 That is, when the govern-
ment uses confinement as punishment, the Constitution enhances a prisoner’s 
constitutional rights vis-à-vis the government. Thus, Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence serves as an exception to the rule that the Constitution is a 
document of negative liberties.5 This affirmative duty contrasts with the 
second and relatively straightforward aspect of prison conditions jurispru-
dence: confinement limits the rights of prisoners to enforce negative restraints 
on state conduct that flow from the Bill of Rights.6  
 
3 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1010-11, 1015-16. 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825, 
833 (1994) (stating that officials have a duty, rooted in the Eighth Amendment, to protect 
prisoners from harm); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (recognizing officials’ 
obligation to provide conditions necessary to satisfy “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (establishing that officials have a 
constitutional duty to provide medical care to prisoners). 
5 See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he 
Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.” (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 318 (1980) and Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
6 That is, constitutional rights are usually significantly narrowed by imprisonment. See Hudson 
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984) (“[W]hile persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protec-
tions of the Constitution, it is . . . clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or 
loss of many significant rights.”). In First Amendment jurisprudence, for instance, the government 
can subject inmates’ free speech to merely reasonable regulation (rather than regulation justified 
by a compelling interest) under the Turner v. Safley test. See 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (listing the 
various considerations that determine whether officials’ limitation of prisoners’ speech is 
reasonable). Fourth Amendment rights are also limited within prison walls because those confined 
have diminished expectations of privacy. See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526 (holding that prisoners 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their prison cell); Nicholas v. Goord, 
430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing prisoners’ lack of right to privacy in cells from 
their limited “right to bodily privacy”). Due process rights, like Fourth Amendment rights, have 
been restricted mostly because of their fact-intensive nature. Thus, because prisoners already 
should expect to have their liberty restricted, prisons must only provide due process protections 
when they threaten the deprivation of liberty that is “atypical and significant” in comparison to 
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There are aspects of prison conditions jurisprudence that do not neatly 
fit this dichotomy. The Eighth Amendment limits the use of force through 
negative restraints on governmental officials,7 while areas of prison juris-
prudence outside of the Eighth Amendment, such as free exercise of 
religion and access to the courts, fit within the affirmative obligation 
rubric.8 And some individual liberties remain in full force despite the fact of 
confinement in prison, most notably the right to be free of discrimination 
on the basis of race.9 In any event, prison conditions jurisprudence is 
generally an amalgam of affirmative duties and negative restraints on the 
state, amounting to an unusual mix in our constitutional framework.10 
It is the reality of incarceration that unites this jurisprudence. The 
state has affirmative obligations to the incarcerated because the state 
itself burdens individuals’ liberties as well as their ability to ameliorate 
the state-imposed burden.11 Without these affirmative obligations, a 
short prison sentence could easily be transformed into a death sentence. 
At the same time, prisoners’ entitlement to fundamental civil liberties 
are limited because they must be balanced against the legitimate peno-
logical interest of the state.12 
 
the “ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (noting the difficulty of following the Sandin test 
but finding that in the case at hand, the state had imposed “an atypical and significant hardship 
under any plausible baseline”). 
7 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (stating that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its the “malicious[] and sadistic[]” use of force). 
8 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (stating that prisons must provide prisoners 
with “[t]he tools . . . the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, 
and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement”); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 56 
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding obligation to provide religious diet where prisoner’s request is 
result of “sincerely held religious beliefs”). 
9 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications). 
10 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) 
(stating that the Due Process Clause is “a limitation on the State’s power to act, not . . . a 
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security”). 
11 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (imposing a duty on the state to take 
reasonable measures to protect inmates from violence because the state itself has “stripped them of 
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid”); DeShaney, 489 
U.S. at 200 (explaining that in prison, when “the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so 
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time 
fails to provide for his basic human needs[,] . . . it transgresses the substantive limits on state 
action set by the Eighth Amendment”). 
12 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“Subjecting the day-to-day judg-
ments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their 
ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration.”). 
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Given this complex framework, Struve might have offered a fuller discus-
sion of where pretrial detainees should fit along this affirmative obligation–
negative restraint continuum. To the extent that the fact of confinement 
creates affirmative obligations that prisoners may enforce against the state, 
one may assume that pretrial detainees are entitled to similar protections. 
But should the limitations on individual liberties also apply to pretrial 
detainees? And more importantly, should they be limited in the same way? 
One can imagine arguments for and against treating pretrial detainees 
similarly to prisoners in the context of traditional individual liberties, but it 
would benefit Struve’s readers and prison conditions jurisprudence at large 
for Struve to engage the question more fully. 
 Struve’s discussion, however, focuses on areas traditionally under-
stood to implicate Eighth Amendment prison conditions litigation: 
access to medical and mental health care, failure to protect, excessive 
force, and overall conditions of confinement.13 She proposes that, first, 
prior to a judicial determination of probable cause, all of these types of 
claims should be analyzed under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
test; and second, after a judicial determination of probable cause, these 
claims should normally be subjected to an “objective” deliberate indif-
ference test.14 If, in any of these contexts, a detainee can show that a 
defendant official had an express intent to punish, then a detainee can 
establish a constitutional violation.15 But, as Struve acknowledges, those 
cases will be few and far between,16 and I will focus, as she does, on the 
selection of the objective deliberate indifference test. 
II. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING 
OBJECTIVE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
I will begin with a practical objection acknowledged by Struve: the diffi-
culty for jail administrators and officials of structuring their behavior so as 
to satisfy three competing standards.17 Struve’s response to this difficulty is 
 
13 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1011; cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-34 (summarizing requirements 
imposed by the Eighth Amendment). 
14 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1061. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 1072. Under Struve’s approach, when a detainee has been arrested without a war-
rant and has yet to be arraigned, the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test would 
provide the framework for evaluating harmful conditions. For arraigned detainees, an objective 
deliberate indifference standard would be the default test for evaluating complaints. And for 
prisoners held in a local jail—and as discussed above there are many of them, see supra note 2—the 
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two-fold: first, she notes that officials already have to consider the role 
that state law may play in regulating conditions of confinement, so 
adding additional standards will not inevitably be problematic;18 and 
second, even if the different standards pose problems for prison administra-
tors, jail officials might respond by housing those held prior to a juridical 
determination of probable cause separately from other individuals.19 
 Struve’s first response provides a limited answer to a difficult question. 
State law is a background regulator of the interactions between jail officials 
and detainees, but constitutional standards are different for several notable 
reasons. First, the principle of respondeat superior operates such that most 
state law causes of action functionally run against entities and not individu-
als.20 By contrast, actions to enforce the Constitution may not proceed 
under a principle of respondeat superior, and as such, liability is always 
personal in nature.21 Although this distinction breaks down somewhat as a 
practical matter, it is not irrelevant.22  
Second, and more importantly, federal constitutional standards do not 
just add a new legal regime to the mix of laws governing state and local 
officials. They interact with state law in at least two important ways: 
sometimes they supplement existing regulation under state law by providing 
greater protection to individual detainees, and at other times they regulate 
completely different spheres of activity.23 Where federal standards serve to 
augment state law, rather than to create entirely new requirements, state 
and local officials must understand clearly what is necessary under each 
standard to determine what a state or municipal official must do in addition 
to what is required under state law. Where federal standards operate in new 
spheres of state conduct, officials still must have a clear understanding of 
the content of their obligations. If Struve’s standards will operate to create 
 
Eighth Amendment’s subjective deliberate indifference would generally apply. See Struve, supra  
note 1, at 1060-61. 
18 See id. at 1074. 
19 See id. at 1072. 
20 See, e.g., David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2192 (2005) 
(finding widespread application of respondeat superior to nonconstitutional torts against 
municipal employees). 
21 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 
22 See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1672-77 & 1675 
n.389 (2003) (noting that prison officials are typically indemnified in § 1983 damages litigation, 
but also documenting ways in which litigation deters individual officers). 
23 For instance, when the Constitution imposes affirmative rights in the area of medical care, 
federal standards often go beyond what state law requires. And when the Constitution regulates 
the kind of legal assistance that must be provided to detainees, they are regulating in a completely 
different sphere of activity than state law. 
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different obligations depending on the status of a detainee—and presumably, 
that is her goal in proposing the different standards—the application of 
each standard will multiply the difficulties in an already complex system. 
 Struve’s second response—that the differing standards may incentivize 
officials to house detainees in different parts of the jail depending on their 
status (an outcome that Struve suggests may be beneficial in other 
ways)24—is also only partly satisfactory. For the purposes of the most 
concrete conditions of confinement—often Rhodes-type issues such as cell 
size, lighting, heating, etc.25—physical separation will perhaps enable 
officials to tailor conditions to detainee status. Even assuming, however, 
that officials will be able to make the fine distinctions between appropriate 
living conditions for warrantless arrestees, detainees housed under a judicial 
imprimatur of probable cause, and convicted prisoners, many other condi-
tions of confinement will not be so easily regulated in this manner. Access 
to medical and mental health care, for instance, is usually governed by a 
uniform, internal policy that provides access to all detainees, regardless of 
status.26 If Struve’s standards will actually result in different conditions of 
confinement, then jails will presumably be required to have different 
minimum standards for different categories of detainees. Individual health 
providers might even be expected to use different criteria to make decisions 
based on whether a detainee is pretrial or convicted. The same is true for 
decisions regarding excessive force or failure to protect. 
To be clear, these practical objections rest to some extent on predic-
tions about the feasibility of applying the different standards proposed by 
Struve, which might be resolved through empirical study at some point in 
the future. And if the standards themselves are sensible, then there is 
value in articulating and applying them, even if it is difficult to imple-
ment them. For reasons that I will explain below, however, my concerns 
go beyond the practical because I fear that Struve’s proposal will not 
provide courts with a rational and coherent approach to conditions of 
confinement for pretrial detainees. 
 
24 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1073 (arguing that the increased costs of housing pretri-
al detainees might lead state and local governments to make pretrial processes speedier 
and more efficient). 
25 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing 
the conditions courts should consider in determining when confinement imposes cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
26 I base this proposition principally on my own experience litigating prison suicide cases, 
which often involve allegations both of gross incompetence by mental health professionals and 
inadequate policies by prison and jail administrators. See also Matos ex rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 
335 F.3d 553, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that an inmate received “a great deal” of medical and 
mental healthcare even while on lockdown). 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO OBJECTIVE 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
A. Lack of Fit with Excessive Force Claims 
Let me start with Struve’s approach to excessive force claims before I 
turn to the overall framework she proposes for pretrial conditions of 
confinement. For those detainees who have not yet been before a judge in 
some form, Struve proposes use of a Fourth Amendment objective reasona-
bleness standard.27 This seems to me to be grounded in a perfectly logical 
theory of state power and the role of the Fourth Amendment in limiting it. 
My worries begin when Struve turns to the adjudication of excessive force 
claims brought by the vast majority of pretrial detainees: post-arraignment 
detainees or those who have been arrested pursuant to a warrant. For these 
detainees, Struve correctly recognizes that the Eighth Amendment exces-
sive force standard, inasmuch as it focuses on malicious and sadistic intent, 
is inappropriate because these detainees should be free of all punishment, 
not just treatment imposed solely for the purpose to harm.28 Therefore, 
Struve proposes that absent a showing of an express intent to punish, a 
post-arraignment detainee must show both that the conditions imposed on 
the inmate posed a “substantial risk of serious harm”29 and that “the defend-
ant knew or reasonably should have known of the risk.”30 In other words, 
Struve recommends moving from a test that measures whether an official 
had a subjective intent to harm (applicable in prison cases) to one that uses 
an objective, deliberate indifference inquiry. 
 Struve means for this standard to offer pretrial detainees greater protec-
tion than prisoners,31 but it is not obvious that her standard would succeed. 
In particular, the requirement that the defendant knew or should have 
known that the amount of force “pos[ed] a substantial risk of serious 
harm”32 to the detainee is problematic. Granted, with respect to the defend-
ant’s state of mind, Struve’s standard requires less proof from a pretrial 
detainee than that demanded of a prisoner; it is easier to show deliberate 
indifference than it is to show sadistic and malicious intent. However, 
Struve’s focus on the “substantial risk of serious harm”—borrowed from the 
Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard—actually demands 
 
27 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1063. 
28 See id. at 1067. 
29 Id. at 1068 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). 
30 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
31 See id. at 1067. 
32 Id. at 1070. 
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more of a pretrial detainee. In the Eighth Amendment excessive force 
context, the inquiry does not focus on the harm at all, but on the force used. 
Thus, under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must only show that a 
defendant used more than a de minimis amount of force while motivated by 
malicious and sadistic intent.33 This is not a trivial distinction. The pre-
sumption behind prisoner excessive force jurisprudence is that any force 
applied for sadistic or malicious reasons will violate the Eighth Amendment 
because a prisoner’s punishment does not include the unnecessary and 
abusive use of force.34 Thus, if a prisoner alleges that a corrections officer 
used force for illegitimate reasons—such as racism—she has alleged a claim 
without regard to whether she has suffered a physical injury.35 Struve’s 
standard, at least on one reading, does not appear to protect pretrial detain-
ees from the kind of low-level physical harassment that the Court intends 
the Eighth Amendment to prohibit.36 Thus, although Struve proposes a 
standard that eases the burdens on a detainee with respect to the showing 
required for a defendant’s state of mind, she has arguably increased the 
burden on a pretrial detainee in terms of the harm suffered from the 
excessive force.37 Without further elaboration from Struve, it is difficult to 
say whether her modified deliberate indifference test will cover uses of 
force that are currently within the reach of the Eighth Amendment. At the 
very least, some justification is required for using a standard that focuses on 
harm as opposed to force. 
 
33 See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1179 (2010) (per curiam). 
34 See Hudson v. McMillian 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“When prison officials maliciously and 
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are vio-
lated. . . . Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter 
how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.”). 
35 See Cole v. Fischer, 379 F. App’x 40, 42 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment because, even though the plaintiff inmate did not allege that he 
suffered any physical injury, the use of force may have been malicious in light of the 
offender’s simultaneous racist speech). 
36 For instance, in Abreu v. Nicholls, the court found that summary judgment was inappropri-
ate where the record suggested a corrections officer used a moderate amount of force in a way that 
threatened the use of “significantly greater force.” 368 F. App’x 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2010). The officer, 
after ordering the plaintiff “not to look at me,” allegedly pressed a rubber hammer against a 
prisoner’s forehead with enough force to bend his head halfway back. Id. at 193. The court held 
that the facts created an inference that force was used for the purpose of humiliating the plaintiff 
and for no other reason. Id. at 194. It is not clear that Struve’s proposed standard for pretrial 
detainees would encompass this kind of use of force. 
37 Struve leaves a door open for pretrial detainees to show that the force used was for the 
express purpose of punishing the detainee. See Struve, supra note 1, at 1061.  
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B. Lack of Connection to Actual Conditions of Confinement 
One can discern a similar logic in Struve’s proposal for addressing 
conditions of confinement for post-arraignment pretrial detainees in 
general. As in the excessive force context, Struve suggests that we 
reduce the requirement that pretrial detainees show subjective deliberate 
indifference and instead require only that pretrial detainees show 
objective deliberate indifference.38 The theoretical basis for this pro-
posed standard is unclear; rather, it appears to represent a compromise 
between the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard and the 
Eighth Amendment’s more rigorous intent-based standard.39 Struve’s 
test might be an attractive meeting place if the Supreme Court addresses 
the distinction between conditions of confinement for pretrial and 
convicted detainees, but that alone does not justify its adoption.40 
However, even assuming that the distinction proposed by Struve will be 
beneficial to pretrial detainees in some cases, I fear that it focuses on the 
aspect of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that is less directly connected 
to conditions of confinement. To appreciate this critique, it is important to 
understand a typical Eighth Amendment case. Whether the issue is exces-
sive force, access to medical care, or failure to protect from harm, every 
Eighth Amendment claim requires the plaintiff to establish two elements: 
(1) some measure of harm and (2) some level of culpability tied to the state 
of mind of the defendant official.41 There are exceptions, which I will 
address below inasmuch as they bear on the limitations of Struve’s proposal, 
but this basic framework pervades Eighth Amendment analysis. In the 
context of subjective deliberate indifference, a prisoner must demonstrate the 
existence of a substantial risk of serious harm combined with a subjectively 
reckless state of mind.42 Struve moves the focus in pretrial detention cases to 
whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant was objectively reckless, 
 
38 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1061. 
39 See Struve, supra note 1, at 1067 (“[T]he standards governing the conditions of judicial 
detention should occupy an intermediate ground between objective reasonableness and subjective 
deliberate indifference.”). 
40 It is, for example, unclear why we should abandon the reasonableness standard that seemed 
to inform the Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, except in the name of compromise. See 441 U.S. 
520, 554 (1979) (“[The] due process rights of prisoners . . . are subject to reasonable limitation or 
retraction in light of the legitimate security concerns of the institution.”). 
41 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (outlining the two-prong test  
under the Amendment). 
42 Id. at 834-35; see also Struve, supra note 1, at 1060-61. 
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but she retains the requirement that the official create the same objective degree 
of harm that is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.43 
If Struve hopes to improve pretrial detention conditions, however, a test 
that focuses on harm is more fruitful than one that focuses on the official’s 
state of mind because the latter does not play a significant role in establish-
ing baseline conditions of confinement. The difference between objective 
and subjective deliberate indifference has, as a functional matter, little to do 
with conditions of confinement. Instead, the difference has to do with the 
level of culpability that will be necessary to impose personal damages 
liability on a particular prison official, sued in her individual capacity. The 
conditions of confinement that are prohibited or permitted by the Constitu-
tion are better measured by referring directly to the objective degree of harm 
that the Constitution tolerates under the deliberate indifference test.44 
One can see this in a variety of contexts. Forward-looking injunctive 
relief claims, which Struve places outside the scope of her Article,45 are 
arguably the best examples of pure conditions of confinement claims. In those 
claims, whether for pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners, the dispute will 
center around the degree of harm posed by the challenged conditions, not 
the extent to which a particular defendant is conscious of the risk of harm.46 
After all, if the defendant were not conscious of the risks before the lawsuit, 
the filing of the claim would suffice to create the level of consciousness 
required by the subjective deliberate indifference test.47 The routine 
substitution of newly-appointed prison officials as named defendants in 
ongoing injunctive claims demonstrates the irrelevance of state of mind 
inquiries to forward-looking injunctive relief.48 
 
43 Struve, supra note 1, at 1068. 
44 As Struve notes, the traditional goals of punishment may not be pursued against pretrial 
detainees. This insight, to put my point another way, is the better starting point. See Struve, supra 
note 1, at 1017 n.45. 
45 Id. at 1067 n.344. 
46 In the systemic litigation surrounding overcrowding and inadequate medical and mental 
health care in California prisons, the central issue was whether the conditions there fell “below the 
standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment,” and not the state of mind of 
defendant officials. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011). Indeed, the deliberate indifference 
state of mind was cited only by the dissenters. Id. at 1960 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
47 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 n.9 (1994). In an injunctive relief claim, an 
official could always claim that despite her awareness of the risk, she is not deliberately 
indifferent because she has responded reasonably to the risk, see id. at 844-45, but this still 
moves the emphasis away from assessing an official’s state of mind toward determining the 
acceptable level for a risk of harm. 
48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) (authorizing the substitution of an official’s successor should the 
official pass away or leave office). 
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Even for retrospective damages claims, it quickly becomes apparent that 
subjective state of mind requirements are important for determining 
liability but less relevant for addressing the material conditions of confine-
ment experienced by prisoners or detainees. For example, if we imagine a 
situation in which a corrections officer used force against a prisoner, the 
officer will be held liable if she intentionally used force that was excessive in 
relation to the threat presented by the prisoner.49 But if we imagine that 
same prisoner suing a supervisor who observed and failed to intervene in 
the beating, the supervisor may be held liable if she was deliberately 
indifferent to the subordinate’s use of excessive force.50 The same suit 
against a bystander officer would require a separate state of mind inquiry. 
Although these claims would involve different levels of culpability, it would 
be strange to say that we are talking about different conditions of confine-
ment in these three circumstances. The prisoner has a right to be free of the 
use of force that goes beyond a “good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline.”51 The different levels of culpability that apply to differently 
situated defendants are simply ways to focus on the personal involvement of 
that particular defendant in a single constitutional violation. 
A similar observation can be made with regard to Monell claims against 
municipalities.52 In prisoners’ rights Monell claims, courts already use the 
objective deliberate indifference test that Struve suggests we adopt for 
pretrial conditions cases.53 This is so even in cases in which the substantive 
claim—say deliberate indifference to medical care or excessive use of 
force—would require a plaintiff to establish an individual official’s subjec-
tive state of mind to recover against the official directly involved in the 
alleged abuse. Indeed, most Monell claims are brought contemporaneously 
with claims against individual defendants.54 Yet it would be inaccurate to 
say that the claims against individual defendants are directed at  
regulating different conditions of confinement than the claims against the  
 
49 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 
50 See, e.g., Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2010) (summarizing case law 
on supervisor liability); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008), (“[S]upervisors are 
liable for the excessive force and the deliberate indifference of their employees where the supervisors 
received numerous reports of prior misconduct of that nature by those same employees and did 
nothing to remedy the situation.”), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
51 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. 
52 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
53 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840-42 (1994) (contrasting the objective deliberate 
indifference standard applied to municipalities with the subjective deliberate indifference standard 
applied to individual prison officials). 
54 See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 356 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing plaintiff ’s suit 
both against defendants in their individual capacities and under Monell). 
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municipality. The burden that a plaintiff must meet to establish her claim is 
different in the two cases, but the ultimate conditions of confinement 
regulated or enforced are the same. 
Thus, if we are to focus on the conditions of confinement, and not the 
conditions under which courts will impose damages liability on individual 
state officers, we should direct attention to the objective degree of harm the 
state causes to a particular detainee or prisoner. Struve acknowledges that it 
would be possible to look to this factor to find space for a pretrial detention 
standard that differs from the standard for prisoners, but discards it on 
pragmatic grounds because it “might be more likely . . . to raise problems 
concerning conflicting standards in the same facility.”55 I agree that focusing 
on the differences between the objective harm constitutionally permissible 
for prisoners and pretrial detainees may have the effect of resulting in 
conflicting standards within the same facility,56 but it is a more straightfor-
ward way to engage in the dialogue that both Struve and I think is worthwhile.  
CONCLUSION 
It may be uncomfortable to specify the ways in which prisoners may 
suffer harsher conditions of confinement in comparison to detainees who 
are presumed innocent. In my view, we would all be better served by having 
that conversation directly rather than seeking to operationalize the same 
intuition through the indirect means of adjusting the state of mind 
requirement in pretrial detention damages cases. Moreover, prisoners may 
ultimately benefit from an exploration of the state’s ability to impose harsh 
conditions of confinement on pretrial detainees. Prisoners housed in jails 
may benefit directly if jail officials have to treat all detainees the same in 
order to meet obligations to pretrial detainees. Prisoners may even benefit 
indirectly by having a renewed discussion about when conditions imposed 
on detainees cannot be justified by the legitimate goal of keeping them 
safely confined until trial. After all, if such conditions do not have a  
legitimate connection to holding detainees in confinement, it may be 
difficult to articulate a reason why they would have a sufficient connection 




55 Struve, supra note 1, at 1078. 
56 This result is by no means inevitable. We might conclude that prisoners are as entitled as 
pretrial detainees to safe housing, sufficient medical care, and adequate shelter. But that is a 
matter beyond the limited scope of this brief Response.  
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